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New theoretical approaches to the state have posed challenges for the comparative analysis of 
the organizational features of states. The analysis of state bodies and state agencies has largely 
been confined to the sub-discipline of public administration, and has been resistant to the 
systematic classification that has made progress possible in other areas of comparative politics. 
This article argues that there is much to be gained by reconceptualizing state bodies in a 
comparative context. This paper profiles the classification system underlying the construction of 
the Irish State Administration Database (ISAD) (Hardiman et al., 2011). This paper sets out a new 
approach to conceptualizing the organizational and functional features of states. ISAD not only 
provides a valuable research resource for work on the Irish state, but can also provide a 




Study of the state in advanced industrial societies often displays a concern either with the 
structural analysis of states, or with the policy objectives pursued by states. What has been 
missing is a bridge between analysis of how states are organized and depiction of what states 
do. 
Even as ideas of the state were contested on theoretical and ideological grounds, analysts 
tended to assume a relatively stable universe of ‘stateness’. This was characterized by a power 
structure conceptualized as hierarchically ordered and sufficiently similar in its principal 
institutional features to make comparison meaningful. But as Migdal has pointed out, the 
‘classic’ model of the state, outlined by Nettl in his influential 1968 paper, has become 
increasingly problematic (Nettl, 1968, Migdal, 2009). We need to do justice to the actual variety 
of types of states rather than arbitrarily drawing lines of eligibility for stateness. This means 
recognizing the ‘Janus-faced’ facets of the state: not only ‘coherent, dominating, competent’, 
standing over the people, but also ‘organically tied to the population’, needing legitimation 
through enactment of some form of social contract, generally expressed through fiscal 
relationships (Migdal, 2009, p.166). This leads to the recognition that states are not uniform in 
their structural features, but that a variety of forms of institutionalized relationships may exist 
between state and society, state and economy (Evans et al., 1985, Weiss, 1998, Weiss, 2003).  
Complementing these structural analyses, a literature has developed about the variety of modes 
of coordinating public policy. What Levy has termed ‘the age of liberalization’, following the 
demise in credibility and effectiveness of the politics of the Keynesian welfare state, has resulted 
in different kinds of state policy being adopted (Levy, 2006). We see not only differences in 
states’ responses to new challenges of economic management and social policy formation 
(Prasad, 2006, Pierson, 2001), but also a variety of public policy responses to a new array of 
issues ranging from environmental challenges, to lifestyle choices, to management of the 
implications of new technologies of communication, reproduction, and so on (Kriesi et al., 2008, 
Vogel and Barma, 2007).  
This means that styles of state engagement with organized interests in society are changing in 
form and purpose (Hemerijck and Vail, 2006). But it also means that the boundaries between 3 
 
state and society are themselves called increasingly into question, as new modes of state action 
are developed to engage civil society actors in processes of policy formation and influence at the 
heart of the deliberative process itself. We need to develop our thinking not only about what a 
state is in general terms, but also about where the boundaries of ‘public’ and ‘private’, ‘state’ 
and ‘civil society’, are to be drawn. One such approach is to start with organized interests and 
work toward a coherent analysis of network governance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2008). Another 
is to investigate state structures themselves, especially the form and scope of state agencies, 
where the diversity of these new modes of state action are most often institutionalized. This is 
the approach adopted in this paper. 
A theme much discussed in recent years is the ‘rise of the regulatory state’ (Braithwaite, 2000, 
Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001, Moran, 2002, Majone, 1994, Jayasuriya, 2000). This has generated 
research into the institutional variety in arrangements for regulating both public and private 
sectors (Levi-Faur, 2005, Gilardi, 2008, Hall, 2007, Binderkrantz and Christensen). Comparison is 
vital for understanding not only the variety of ways in which government tasks get done, but 
also the means by which they are legitimated. Mechanisms of implementing new regulatory 
regimes on the one hand, and creating new lines of accountability on the other, form an 
important part of a broader trend toward what is now known as regulatory governance (Hood 
and Dunsire, 1981: chapter 2, Binderkrantz and Christensen, Christensen and Laegreid, 2007a). 
But central to making progress on this is agreement on the characterization and typologies of 
regulatory agencies themselves (Levi-Faur, 2006, Scott, 2004). The statutory basis of regulation 
as a principal distinguishing feature has itself been questioned in recent literature, with growing 
recognition of the role of private regulatory regimes and transnational regulatory regimes that 
are not overtly directed by states. We also find an interest developing in the emergence of the 
contracting state (Edgeworth, 2003, Harden, 1992, Freeman, 2000, La Porta et al., 1999); and 
new classificatory challenges are also emerging to capture the changing role of the state in 
relation to such functions as the delivery of public services and taxation of citizens and 
businesses.  
But is it possible to go beyond a focus on particular modes of state action, or policy domains, or 
legal forms of action, and to make progress with the ‘anatomy of state structures’ overall? We 
believe it is. 4 
 
This paper outlines what is at issue for comparative politics in developing a classification system 
for understanding the state from an institutional and organizational perspective. We outline 
what we believe are the key theoretically valuable dimensions of variation. This 
conceptualization has  informed the construction of the Irish State Administration Database 
(ISAD) (www.isad.ie), which forms part of a project funded by the Irish Research Council for 
Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS) from 2007 to 2010 (Hardiman et al., 2011). This is a 
time-series database of all national-level units, coding information about the organizational 
features of agencies and other units in the state administrative system, the structural 
reorganization of government departments, and the creation, life-cycle and termination of 
agencies. The database includes information on more than 700 public organizations that have 
existed between 1922 and the present, including a number that precede the formation of the 
state. 
The Irish State Administration Database has already proved its value to a variety of users 
including academic researchers, public officials, and journalists, among others. We also show 
how the schema we develop here might be aggregated into a comparable analytical framework 
at higher or lower levels of specificity.  
State ‘agencies’ in Ireland 
All approaches to classification – and not only state organizations and ‘agencies’ - presuppose an 
underlying conception of the relevant distinctions that need to be made which are grounded in 
a set of theoretical questions about how the world is ordered.  
In a famous passage from Borges’ story ‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’ the author 
describes a Chinese encyclopedia in which the classification of animals divides them as follows:  
1.  those that belong to the Emperor, 
2.  embalmed ones, 
3.  those that are trained, 
4.  suckling pigs, 
5.  mermaids, 
6.  fabulous ones, 
7.  stray dogs, 5 
 
8.  those included in the present classification, 
9.  those that tremble as if they were mad, 
10. innumerable ones, 
11. those drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, 
12. others, 
13. those that have just broken a flower vase, 
14. those that from a long way off look like flies.  
Michel Foucault explains in the preface to The Order of Things that this literary ‘how not to do it’ 
guide to classification from Borges evoked much laughter but also inspired his own study of the 
centrality and changing significance of classifications for understanding the world (Foucault, 
1970: pp. xv).  Foucault suggests that ‘there is nothing more tentative, nothing more empirical 
(superficially, at least) than the process of establishing  an order among things; nothing that 
demands a sharper eye or a surer, better articulated language; nothing that more insistently 
requires that one allow  oneself to be carried along by the proliferation of qualities and forms.’ 
(Foucault, 1970: pp. xix-xx).  
The problem of classification of central state agencies begs similar questions of relevance and 
utility. Classification of Irish state institutions can at times seem to be prone to Borgesian 
opacity. There is no uniform definition of the Irish public service, and different ways of 
delineating the boundaries have resulted in very different total numbers (McGauran et al., 2005, 
Clancy and Murphy, 2006, MacCarthaigh, 2010, Fine Gael, 2010). The numbers vary depending 
on considerations such as, for example, how one deals with bodies with a primarily local remit 
within a national policy setting such as Harbour Commissions, County Development Boards, and 
Vocational Education Committees; whether the definition of ‘publicness’ is confined to statutory 
bodies or not; whether or not Commissions of Inquiry, advisory bodies of limited duration, and 
other non-statutory bodes are included, and if so, where the cut-off point is set.  
Different classification systems therefore have implications for how one counts, and the total 
number of ‘agencies’ in Ireland is far from unambiguous. The Irish State Administration 
Database identifies 374 national-level units in 2010, including government departments, 
constitutional offices, state commercial bodies, universities and other kinds of organization. This 
total includes15 ministerial departments; there are also about 13 constitutional and government 6 
 
offices in existence at any one time, such as the Comptroller and Auditor General’s Office, the 
Ombudsman offices, and major bodies such as An Garda Síochána. Excluding these units, one 
reaches a total of 346 organizations. In contrast, the Department of Finance listed 82 non-
commercial state agencies in 2011 (Department of Finance, 2011, pp. 204-6). These totals 
compare with 211 listed in the IPA study by McGauran and others,  (McGauran et al., 2005), 249 
in an IPA study of 2010 (MacCarthaigh, 2010), and 482 identified by TASC (Clancy and Murphy, 
2006), and while the totals may vary slightly depending on the year of each survey, the profile of 
agencies included or excluded varies a good deal too. 
In Ireland, the statutory definition of the public service is based on public liability for pay and 
pension entitlements of staff (as, for example, in the Public Service (Miscellaneous Provision) 
Act 2004. A somewhat broader three-way classification is commonly used which includes 
reference to ownership, appointment and funding:  
An Irish public sector organisation is defined as any employing body which: (a) directly 
derives the majority of its share capital from Irish public funds, or (b) has the majority of 
its Board/Executive members appointed by an Irish Minister, or (c) directly derives the 
majority of its revenue from Irish public sources (Clancy and Murphy, 2006). 
 
Standardized Eurostat reporting requirements centre on accountability for public spending, 
which leads Irish officials to prioritize this criterion such that bodies with 50% or more of their 
budget line coming from official sources is included as a state ‘agency’.  
The official definitions cited above are a valuable starting point, though they can have some 
surprising implications. For example, the share capital criterion certainly captures ministries and 
agencies, boards, and state-owned enterprises, but not bodies that have an official function 
though they are privately owned. The second criterion relating to appointment captures certain 
entities which are legally (private) companies limited by guarantee, but whose national 
importance has resulted in an ongoing governmental role in appointing directors. Various 
cultural organizations in Ireland, such as the National Concert Hall, would fall into this category. 
Such organizations might or might not also be captured by the third indicator, which stipulates 
that 50% or more of their funding come from public sources. The Universities would meet this 
criterion. But so too, arguably, would the large number of non-governmental providers of 7 
 
educational and health care facilities and services which are substantially state-funded within 
the Irish system of ‘voluntary’ provision (Cousins, 2005). To accept these organizations, owned 
and managed by a complex range of charities, religious denominations, and other NGOs, as 
unambiguously part of the state, would entail a misleading representation of the policy 
capabilities of the Irish state. While the religious and charitable sector of service provision is 
perhaps unusually large in Ireland, it is a familiar feature of many other European states too, 
particularly where the Catholic Church has historically had a strong presence. ‘Following the 
money trail’ turns out to be too inclusive as a sole criterion, independent of legal form or 
function. Multiple criteria for inclusion seem to be indicated, and decision-rules are required for 
the hard cases. 
The Irish State Administration Database is a research database that makes it possible to analyse 
state functions and activities as they are expressed through organizational structures. It 
recognizes that variety of different analytical questions might be posed.  We consider therefore 
that it may be misleading to seek to identify a single optimal classification of state ‘agencies’ 
along one organizational dimension.  No single schema can capture all relevant dimensions. Our 
starting point is our concern with national-level organization. The database at present therefore 
does not include bodies which are chiefly responsible to local authorities or which have a 
primarily local remit.  
The theoretical concerns of the ‘Mapping the Irish State’ project which underpin the 
construction of the Irish State Administration Database centre on the manner in which public 
power is exercised to achieve different kinds of policy objectives: it is about the policy capacity 
of the state, as expressed by its institutional forms (Hardiman and Scott, 2010). Much of the 
comparative analysis of state organization is committed to explaining how as well as why states 
shift the boundaries of state action. The flourishing literature on governance is devoted to 
understanding changing patterns of engagement between governments, organized interests, 
and private actors, as well as the changing scope of ‘markets’ and ‘networks’ in mediating these 
relationships (Provan and Kenis, 2008, Kooiman, 2003, Kjaer, 2004). Our perspective recognizes 
that the boundaries of the state itself are ambiguous and blurred. The specification of where we 
draw the boundary lines is necessarily contestable. But by making explicit how we have drawn 
these distinctions, we hope to have created a resource that is useful for multiple research 
inquiries.  8 
 
The first and central question is therefore to ask what an ‘agency’ is. The most straightforward 
approach, and the one offering least scope for contentious definitions, is to make a sharp 
distinction between central government departments or ministries on the one hand, and state 
agencies, in the sense of bodies that operate at arm’s-length from ministerial departments, on 
the other. As MacCarthaigh in this volume also notes, the approach proposed by Pollitt and his 
colleagues would count as an ‘agency’ only those bodies that are defined by public law, and 
functionally distinct from and independent of the government ministry (MacCarthaigh, 2012, 
Pollitt et al., 2004). This is the classic and well-established model adopted by most public 
administration scholars and it has the merit of minimizing ambiguity and maximizing certainty. 
But in the process, it incurs two difficulties, and in the process risks exchanging clarity for 
generalizability. The first is that making a sharp distinction between government ministries and 
state agencies, while recognizable within the British Whitehall model, may not be appropriate in 
other jurisdictions.  
But furthermore, the characterization of agencies themselves may be unduly restrictive. An 
exclusive focus on statutory agencies may be too narrow a criterion to capture important 
instruments used to exercise state power through informal channels. It would exclude many of 
the so-called quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations or quangos that proliferated in 
the English-speaking world from the 1970s on, and often animated by the theoretical concerns 
of New Public Management (Pollitt and Bouckhaert, 2004). ’Quango’ is merely an awkward word 
for what has become a widely acknowledged phenomenon: the growth of new instruments 
through which public power may be exercised. Pollitt’s criterion risks arbitrarily defining 
‘stateness’ with reference to statutory basis. We lose the capacity to analyse a range of modes 
of exercise of public authority that are distinct from private initiative – new modes of 
governance expressed through new forms of polity (Hardiman and Scott, 2010). Therefore the 
Irish State Administration Database includes all organizational units that are relevant to the 
exercise of public power. It includes ministerial and non-ministerial departments, change in 
which, as MacCarthaigh in this shows, can vividly illuminate significant shifts in state activity and 
public policy concerns (MacCarthaigh, 2012). It also includes constitutional offices of state – the 
Revenue Commissioners, the Office of the Attorney General, and so on – because these too are 
vital instruments through which public objectives are pursued. 9 
 
An influential theoretical approach to classifying and explaining change in public administration 
is to think in two dimensions – both hierarchically, where the vertical dimension captures the 
degree of centralization or autonomy of particular bodies, and laterally, where the horizontal 
dimension represents the differentiation of tasks at the same level of hierarchy. A positional 
analysis was developed from reflection on the Norwegian state, and informs the Norwegian 
State Administration Database, which captures national-level state organization in Norway from 
1947 (Norwegian Social Science Data Services, 2011). This approach also underlies the 
comparative work undertaken by the COBRA research group, comparing the structure and 
functioning of state agencies across a range of European countries (COST-CRIPO, 2007-11). The 
classificatory schema captures greater complexity than a single-dimension classification schema. 
It may be rather limited, though, as a tool for more extensive comparative investigation of how 
states function (Roness, 2007, p. 65, Verhoest et al., 2010, Rolland and Roness, 2009, Roness et 
al., 2008). 
A spatial conception also informs the bureaumetric work of Hood and Dunsire (Hood and 
Dunsire, 1981). More recently Flinders  adopts a ‘Russian doll’ metaphor for Whitehall, with 
departments at the centre and ever more peripheral bodies beyond it, the further out from the 
centre we go (Flinders, 2008). This is valuable for indicating the distinction between core and 
periphery and for highlighting the increasing degree of policy dispersion the further agencies are 
located from the core. Spatial models of organization can be useful for identifying how 
institutions in a particular polity relate to one another. But a relational grid provides a 
somewhat limited purchase on changes either in the policy areas in which the state is involved, 
or in the mode of action through which it operates.  
The need for a multi-dimensional classification of state bodies 
The preceding considerations outline some of the reasons why any classification system aimed 
at drawing the boundaries of ‘the state’ is controversial, and why all classifications are imbued 
with theoretical concerns, whether these are explicitly acknowledged or not. The Irish State 
Administration Database sorts and classifies organizational units according to several different 
criteria: the principal distinctions are as follows: 
 10 
 
1.  ‘Publicness’ 
2.  Function 
3.  Policy domain 
4.  Legal status 
This gives us a fourfold set of considerations for classifying and analysing public bodies. It also 
makes it possible to select sub-sets of units according to alternative criteria – for example, by 
excluding ministerial departments and constitutional offices, or selecting only statutory bodies – 
if the intention was to undertake an analysis based on any of the administrative classification 
systems discussed above.  
1. Criteria for inclusion based on ‘publicness’ 
The meaning of ‘publicness’ in selecting bodies for inclusion as organizationally part of the Irish 
state cannot readily be captured by a single criterion, but instead involves a spectrum of 
organizational forms. Public ownership is perhaps an obvious starting point: any unit with more 
than 50% direct state capital qualifies for inclusion (including publicly recapitalized banks, after 
2008). But we also include organizations that may be private in ownership but which have 
monopoly status to discharge a national public function. At one end of our spectrum, we can 
position statutory state agencies, both commercial and non-commercial, where ’publicness’ in 
this sense is beyond question. Public-private partnerships can be seen as representing a variant 
on state commercial enterprises, but they are on a different point on the scale. Other kinds of 
relationships between the state and private organizations also function as extensions of public 
power. Agencies may take a range of legal and organizational forms and may include ordinary 
companies with a significant element of public ownership or funding (Christensen and Laegreid, 
2007b: 66-68). Furthermore, state functions may be discharged through the delegation of public 
authority to private actors to conduct certain tasks under licence, or under the umbrella of a 
statutory provision. There are many example of this sort: for example, Repak, as an industry 
organization, is a privately owned and managed body dealing with recycling of industrial 
packaging; but it is specifically named in statute, and has a regulatory responsibility delegated to 
it that is indisputably a public function (S.I. No. 242/1997: Waste Management (Packaging) 
Regulations, 1997). 11 
 
 Similarly, government may permit sectoral self-regulation by recognized bodies as a direct 
substitute for statutory regulation: this is the case, for example, with the Irish Bar Council and 
the Irish Law Society. This may extend to the adoption by public law of privately set standards, 
and statutory instruments may even adopt private standards without modification. For example, 
the Irish Statute Book often incorporates ISO standards into mandatory requirements, as is the 
case, for example, with Product Safety Regulations (SI199/2004, regs 5(2), (3)).  An illustration of 
the spectrum of state organizational possibilities, conceptualized in terms of the public-private 
dimension, is summarized in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1. The spectrum of state organization: the public-private dimension  
Thus rather than accepting a cut-off point at the statutory end of the spectrum, we open more 
powerful analytical tools for understanding state action by recognizing the longer spectrum of 
possibilities, and create more opportunities for engaging in real comparative inquiry about the 
extent to which different modalities of state action are adopted cross-nationally (Rudder, 2008, 
Flinders, 2008). Yet at all times we must bear in mind that what controls the scope and 
dimensions of the delegation of authority is ‘the shadow of hierarchy’, that is, the democratic 
mandate of an elected government to control and discipline (Goetz, 2008, Scharpf, 1994, 
Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008, Boerzel, 2007).  
2.  Functional classification 
The Irish State Administration Database classifies agencies according to a number of criteria, 
including function, policy domain, legal form, and accountability.  
We consider that functional classification is particularly important, as it enables us to capture a 
variety of modes of state action and a range of methods of achieving these. There is no 
international agreement on the best way to categorize state functions. Dunleavy, for example, 
makes the following distinctions : regulation, transfer, contracts, control, taxing, trading, and 
servicing (Dunleavy, 1989a, pp. 254-5, Dunleavy, 1989b).  
But we find Dunleavy’s classification less than satisfactory: it is based on a budget-centred 
analysis, and is not primarily designed to analyse changes in the mode of state activity. 
Bouckaert and Peters press the functional classification further, and also include 12 
 
implementation (distinguishing between direct service delivery and transfer of funds), 
regulation, advice and policy development, information, research, Tribunals and public 
enquiries, and representation (Bouckaert and Peters, 2002). We find this classification schema 
useful and stimulating, but we think it is both overly specific (why Tribunals and public enquiries, 
when the role and significance of such bodies varies so greatly across countries?), and less than 
comprehensive (what about taxation?). A similar critique may be extended to classification 
schemes based on organizational ecology (Peters and Pierre, 2001).  
The United Nations’ Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) provides a schema 
intended for cross-national comparative analysis (United Nations, 2011). However, what the UN 
calls ‘functions’ are perhaps more appropriately conceptualized as policy domains. COFOG is not 
concerned with functions in the sense of scope of state activity or mode of state action. It is 
specifically intended to make it possible to trace budgetary change independent of structural 
change – that is, it is designed to flatten out changes in state structures, which is exactly what 
we are most interested in tracking.  
We believe it is necessary to modify and extend existing classifications of state functions. In two 
cases, for example, Dunleavy identifies fundamentally similar functions but distinguishes them 
from each other by reference to whether they relate to other parts of the public sector or to 
non-state actors. Thus ‘control’ agencies are involved in both funding and regulating other 
public sector bodies. We classify such bodies as transfer agencies where they are chiefly 
involved in funding, and regulatory bodies where they are chiefly involved in oversight (though 
clearly the two may overlap a good deal, and it may be useful for some analytical purposes to 
identify both a primary and a secondary function). Similarly, ‘servicing’ agencies are those 
providing services to other parts of the public sector. Where such services are charged for (as is 
increasingly the case), we classify the agencies in question as trading bodies. Where they do not 
charge we classify them as delivery bodies. In this way we have stripped out the ‘control’ and 
‘servicing’ categories from Dunleavy’s analysis, in favour of categories that are simpler, action-
based, and potentially easier to apply unambiguously in a comparative context.   
Dunleavy left out agencies charged with adjudication and grievance handling, while Bouckaert 
and Peters specify them more narrowly with reference to Tribunals of inquiry. Whilst the most 
visible forms for such agencies are the Ombudsman offices of various kinds, this class may also 13 
 
include courts, tribunals and related adjudicatory offices. And one of the emergent themes of 
our analysis of the Irish state is the importance of new adjudicatory bodies set up to meet new 
designations of rights and grievances among citizens which fall outside conventionally justiciable 
claims (Hardiman and Scott, 2010). 
A further lacuna in Dunleavy’s typology is the variety of agencies involved in gathering or 
representing information or views. There is a large number of bodies exercising forms of ‘soft 
power’ through advice, consultation, representation and advocacy which appear to lack a home 
in Dunleavy’s typology. Distinct from these are the bodies charged with investigation and with 
gathering information and broader research functions (Roness, 2007, p.68). If anything, 
Bouckaert and Peters’ list has too much bias towards the soft power functions, and provides 
separate categories for advice and policy development; information; research; and 
representation. Their list recognizes tribunals and public inquiries as a category, but neglects 
contracting and taxing agencies.  
 
3. Policy domains 
As we note above, the United National COFOG classification is more appropriately viewed as a 
set of policy areas in which states may be involved. Because COFOG is an international standard, 
the Irish State Administration Database classifies all agencies according to the COFOG schema, 
providing both a primary and a secondary COFOG designation for each one. In addition, we have 
developed a separate classification of policy domains which, while inspired by the Irish 
experience, should also be of wider comparative relevance. The principal contrast with COFOG is 
in the more detailed specification of economic policy and economic performance.  
4. Legal form 
The majority of public agencies in Ireland are constituted as statutory bodies. But a number of 
bodies are clearly public on criteria such as ownership or funding, yet do not have a statutory 
basis for their activities. In other cases, bodies that are formally private may be able to exercise 
authority that is legally binding, such as for example the Law Society of Ireland. The Law Society 
differs from other (private) professional bodies is that it has delegated statutory authority to 
authorize and discipline solicitors. The possession of authority generally is not a monopoly of the 
state. But the capacity to delegate through legislation is something unique to the state, and the 14 
 
statutory delegation of power seems to us to bestow a public character to the body in question 
which is not captured in other mechanisms of classification.  
While explicit instances of the delegation of statutory authority are clear and documented, a 
more difficult case is that of implicit delegation (Scott, 2003). By its nature this is not capable of 
precise definition, and it develops where there is an understanding about mutual expectations 
between political decision-makers and an organized social sector. A recent example in Ireland 
concerns the establishment of the Press Council of Ireland and Press Ombudsman by the media 
industry in the face of indications from government that recommendations to establish a 
statutory press complaints body would be implemented, should no effective self-regulatory 
regime be put in place (Brown and Scott, 2010, p.20).  
Both statutory and implicit delegation may occur post hoc, as in the case where legislation 
adopts a standard put forward by a non-state body such as the International Standards 
Organization, or where government gives implicit approval to a self-regulatory regime such as 
that of the Advertising Standards Authority of Ireland. The ‘publicness’ of regimes of implicit 
delegation may be demonstrated by the observation that the UK counterpart to the Advertising 
Standards Authority of Ireland has routinely been subjected to judicial review on the basis that a 
statutory agency would otherwise have to be established to undertake its functions (Black, 
1996). It is unclear whether an Irish court would follow this logic. 
Putting these four considerations together, we can see from Table 1 below that the classification 
scheme of ISAD is multidimensional, and captures a wide range of variation along discrete 
principles of organizational form. 
Table 1. Criteria for classifying ‘units’ in the Irish State Administration Database 
Since each unit in the database is coded according to multiple criteria, complex cross-cutting 
searches can be undertaken to identify patterns in the evolution of the organizational 
foundations of the Irish state. For example, as Figure 2 below shows, statutory bodies are the 
largest single category of stage agency, and the fastest growing over time, followed by 
companies; but these do not exhaust the variety of legal forms in use. 
Figure 2. Legal Forms of All National-Level Units 15 
 
 
Indeed, what is perhaps most interesting is the number of non-statutory, non-departmental 
bodies that warrant inclusion in virtue of their significance to policy formation or the direct 
discharge of a public function. 
These kinds of bodies are of course more likely to be found in some policy areas more than 
others. Figures 3 and 4 show the composition of legal forms  among  regulatory,  advisory, and 
consultative bodies. 
Figure 3. Legal Forms of Regulatory Agencies in Ireland 
 
Figure 4. Legal Forms of Advisory Agencies in Ireland 
 
We can see from Figure 3 that the great majority of regulatory agencies have a statutory basis – 
but that there are also agencies whose primary function is regulation but that do not have this 
form. On the other hand, advisory agency functions are considerably more likely to have a non-
statutory, non-departmental legal form. Rather than arbitrarily excluding this entire category 
from our conception of ‘stateness’, we consider that it adds to our understanding of the growing 
complexity of the role and functioning of the state itself to recognize their role and to make 
appropriate classificatory provision. We can therefore capture bodies that clearly are central to 
core public policy concerns, such as the Irish Council for Science, Technology and Innovation, 
which is a non-statutory, non-departmental body. We can also capture the direct representation 
of civil society interests into the core of the state through a statutory non-departmental agency, 
as in the case of the National Traveller Accommodation Consultative Committee. The 
emergence of a range of agencies representing public concerns at the heart of the state is akin 
to Lindvall and Rothstein’s observation that the Swedish state has seen a proliferation of bodies 
devoted to just this function. They claim that this amounts to a kind of institutionalized 
‘ideological state apparatus’, through which government endorses and promotes some 
behavioural, attitudinal and lifestyle values over others (Lindvall and Rothstein, 2006).  
 16 
 
Toward a meta-classification schema 
We need to be able to draw upon a comparative classification system if we want to compare not 
only the current structure of the central state across countries, but also how the trajectory of 
change within individual countries compares with that of other countries.  Yet comparative 
studies of state structures and public administration systems are bedeviled by problems of 
comparability. State organization has evolved rather differently in different countries, 
depending in part on the type of legal system involved. Ireland and Britain, with common law 
systems and centralized and (until recently in the case of Britain) unitary states, have enjoyed 
greater freedom in creating and rationalizing public bodies than in countries with a tradition of 
administrative law, especially if these are federal in structure (Rhodes et al., 2009, Peters et al., 
2000). New Public Management was undertaken more enthusiastically in the former than the 
latter, but a strong trend toward growing ‘agencification’ has been noted not only in Ireland, as 
MacCarthaigh discusses in this volume, but across the advanced industrial societies, beginning in 
the 1980s and gathering pace everywhere during the 2000s (Christensen and Laegreid, 2006, 
van Thiel, 2009, MacCarthaigh, 2012).  
We have noted above that there is no general agreement as to the total number of state 
agencies in Ireland, and that the numbers arrived at are heavily dependent on the classification 
scheme adopted. The problem of comparing numbers cross-nationally is further compounded 
by the fact that agencies of any sort have a different significance in different countries. Drawing 
on a two-dimensional relational classification in order to obtain a consistent definition, the 
international team associated with the COBRA research programme found that while Ireland 
had 210 national non-commercial agencies, Denmark had 262, and Norway 215; Italy had 57, 
while the Netherlands had 574. There is no unambiguous way of evaluating whether there is an 
optimal number for each country, or when a country may be said to have too many state 
agencies (COST-CRIPO, 2007-11). 
Nevertheless, there is a growing cross-national interest in further refining the bases for 
systematic classification of state organizational structures, the better to be able to develop 
general explanations that are robust across national jurisdictions (Nassmacher, 2008). This 
challenge has been overcome in analysis of other institutional configurations of modern states 
such as party systems, legislatures, federal structures, and judicial systems. All these frequently 17 
 
display strongly idiosyncratic features, and national histories are by definition unique, yet robust 
comparative classification systems are now widely acceptable, facilitating a rich comparative 
research agenda (Stoll, 2008, Karvonen and Kuhnle, 2001, Mair and Mudde, 1998).  
Classifying state agencies is relatively straightforward where these have a statutory base. But 
there are other less obvious instances where we find no clear and unambiguous distinction 
between public and private. Real difficulty may arise in drawing boundaries between what 
counts as ‘stateness’ and what falls outside the definition of the state, to be definitively situated 
as a market phenomenon or as part of civil society. We recognize that the extent of ‘publicness’ 
of agencies and of the exercise of public authority through organizations, has to be understood 
as constituting a spectrum. Roness notes in his analysis of four countries’ very different 
classification systems that each country’s classification schema tends to be inductively 
generated and specific to the analytical requirements of that country’s politics (Roness, 2007). 
Roness notes not only that the most persuasive national classification systems devised for 
Britain, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia, originated in rather different theoretical 
preoccupations with budgets, efficiency, and accountability, but also that the different legal 
traditions underpinning them give rise to very different ways of organizing authority 
relationships.  
The approach outlined in this paper is intended to provide a comprehensive classification for 
one country. But we also believe that our work may contribute to building a more generally 
useful classificatory system. We have drawn on underlying principles to sort state functions that 
we think can be applied to other public administration systems. There is already considerable 
interest in drawing upon ISAD to inform the construction of national databases, particularly 
among scholars in Hungary, Estonia, and in the Flanders region of Belgium (COST-CRIPO, 2007-
11).  
The test of the usefulness of our analytical schema for national-level state functioning must 
come through application to comparative data. Among the inherent difficulties in conducting 
research on the activities of states is that state policy capabilities may be organized at different 
levels of competence and with different jurisdictional properties. For example, responsibility for 
aspects of the welfare state is shared in many countries between national, regional, and 
municipal levels. If particular policy areas such as health-care or education, for example, are 18 
 
organized in multi-level governance systems in some countries, but are highly centralized in 
others, a national-level comparison will be misleading.  
To some extent this can be overcome through the multidimensional design of our schema. 
Inevitably, there will be losses in the comprehensiveness of the coverage. Yet we believe that a 
focus on national-level state action is nevertheless warranted. Integrating sub-national 
government capabilities introduces a complexity that we believe is not warranted in terms of 
explanatory payoff at this time. 
As an interim step, however, we propose that it is possible to design a meta-level of 
comparative classification to which a range of national classification systems might be 
assimilable. We envisage a re-classification of existing national schemata along the principles we 
have followed for Ireland, to provide the basis for making the classification systems themselves 
more genuinely comparable at a higher level of generalizationWe suggest that this might be 
done by further aggregating the functions of agencies with reference to Christopher Hood’s 
analysis of the ‘tools of government’. 
In Hood’s view, government activities can be conceptualized as involving four categories of 
action that are embedded in particular organizational forms, which he terms nodality, authority, 
treasure and organisation, or NATO (Hood 1984; Hood and Margetts 2007). 
  Nodality refers to the location of government at the centre of key networks and the 
potential for learning through gathering information and for shaping behaviour by 
handing out information.  
  Authority evokes the distinctive capacity of the state for requiring citizens, associations 
and firms to do things, backed by the possibility of legal sanctions.  
  Treasure refers to the state’s capacity to mobilize wealth, largely collected from tax 
revenue, in pursuing its objectives.  
  Organization implies government’s deployment of its directly controlled resources – 
staff, buildings, equipment, etc. – in fulfilling public tasks. 19 
 
Each of these tool types can be deployed both for gathering information, or  ‘detecting’, and for 
shaping behaviour, or ‘effecting’ (Hood and Margetts, 2007: 5-7). 
Most government agencies are liable to use most of these tools periodically – they comprise the 
basic ways in which to get things done. Nevertheless, the tools of government provide a 
framework within which the functions identified for agencies can be organized into family 
groups. Thus advisory functions operate chiefly through the positioning of the agency at the 
centre of key networks. Regulation operates mainly through the deployment of authority. 
Transfer agencies operate principally through the deployment of money (and conditions 
associated with its grant) and delivery agencies work largely through the deployment of their 
own organisational resources. 
Some examples drawn from the contemporary Irish central state are shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. NATO Tools and Functions of State Agencies 
Hood and Margetts argue that the NATO approach offers a comprehensive analysis of the tools 
available to government. They also hold that the principal focus for the analysis of such tools 
should be the state. Our analysis of agency functions in Ireland supports the first claim. The 
second proposition is more contestable. Classically the state is said to possess a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of force (Weber, 1978). That proposition is often deployed uncritically to 
support the idea that government has a monopoly over the use of tools based in authority. 
However, in practice governments delegate the power to use legal authority, or support the 
assumption of such power through structures for the enforcement of contractual authority. 
Contractual authority provides the binding element over members of self-regulatory or 
associational regimes of regulation. This is the kind of authority associated with trade 
associations and indeed with private firms’ use of contracts to require compliance with 
standards and their certification by third parties. Even in the case of the most state-like of the 
tools of government, the space is shared with self-regulatory bodies, firms and others with 
delegated statutory or assumed contractual authority.  
In the case of the other tools it is more obvious that there is no state monopoly. Any person or 
organization with money can use their money to steer behaviour, whether illicitly, as with 
corrupt payments to government officials,  or lawfully, as with donations to political campaign 20 
 
funds or the use of purchasing power to achieve particular social or political objectives (for 
example the promotion of higher payments to coffee growers within fair trade regimes).  
This shared capacity between state and non-state actors is also found with nodality. 
Participation in networks and the gathering and dissemination of information are the main tools 
used by the lobbying and PR industries to further the interests of their clients.  Many 
organizations use such tools to try to shape the behaviour of governmental and other actors.  
The NATO classification offers a wide-ranging analysis of how to get things done. But its 
properties are not exclusive to state organizations. In our view, this is a distinct advantage. The 
flexibility of NATO gives it real potential as a tool of meta-classification for the spectrum of state 
bodies we have identified in this paper. 
Conclusion 
Over the last two decades, interest in the comparative study of states has grown, but the 
analytical and comparative tools that make it possible to develop a comparative research 
agenda have remained relatively weakly developed. The variety of classification schemata has 
led to a fragmentation of nation-specific studies. For those committed to a conception of the 
social sciences as theoretically grounded and inherently comparative in orientation, the result 
may seem dispiritingly limited, inductive, and descriptive.  
However, we take a more optimistic view, for two reasons. Firstly, developments in the 
comparative study of political parties, or social movements, or constitutions, or legislatures, 
were often made possible by the accumulation of specific expertise across many different 
national settings. The Irish State Administration Database provides a flexible research resource 
which not only captures more of the range of variation present in Ireland than any other schema 
to date, but also provides a model for the conceptualization and construction of research 
databases on this model, a trend that will in time extend and deepen the scope for comparative 
inquiry. Secondly, as both an interim and as a complementary approach, we propose it may be 
possible to generate a useful analytical schema at a higher level of aggregation.  
The Irish State Administration Database proposes a new classification of state functions that is 
simpler, more comprehensive, and more generalizable than any others to date. We believe that 21 
 
that no single dimension of classification will capture the real variation in state activity. 
Functional analysis takes us only so far; it needs to be complemented by a classification that 
adequately distinguishes between state and non-state structures and activities, and that makes 
it possible to capture the spectrum between public and private modes of action. Further 
classificatory distinctions based on legal form and ownership illuminate important dimensions of 
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Figure 1. The spectrum of state organization: the public-private dimension  
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Figure 2. Legal Forms of All National-Level Units 
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Table 2. NATO Tools and Functions of State Agencies 
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